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Decolonising Philosophy 
Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Rafael Vizcaíno,  
Jasmine Wallace and Jeong Eun Annabel We
The persistence of the small number of philosophers and theorists of 
colour in the academy, both inside and outside philosophy depart-
ments, who critically engage questions of coloniality, inequalities, 
decolonisation and liberation, has contributed to keep the question of 
the decolonisation of philosophy relevant. Some of them have taken the 
lead in the creation of new institutional spaces and organisms, including 
programmes to train students of colour in philosophy, groups in large 
professional associations, book series and scholarly journals and even 
new organisations such as Philosophy Born of Struggle or the Caribbean 
Philosophical Association, to name only two of the most visible. Philos-
ophers of colour in the academy also tend to engage in various forms 
of teaching and mentoring that prepare new generations of students in 
expanding the horizons of academic philosophy and in pursuing the 
decolonisation of the field. 
While these and other efforts have been crucial in the introduction 
and cultivation of new readings and subfields in some philosophy depart-
ments and professional associations, it will be difficult to contest the idea 
that, generally speaking, philosophy as a field or a discipline in modern 
Western universities remains a bastion of Eurocentrism, whiteness in 
general, and white heteronormative male structural privilege and superi-
ority in particular. One only has to look at curricular design and content, 
the overwhelming absence of people of colour in classrooms and phil-
osophical reading lists despite the existence of a few, and to the criteria 
for merit and promotion in the field. It is no secret either, that this state 
of affairs is part of the legacy of Western imperialism, racialised slavery, 
white heteronormative male supremacy, and segregation, which highly 
elevated the value of civilisation and abstract universality, and exclusively 
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linked them with concepts, norms and values that were considered to be 
of European provenance. 
Because philosophy is grounded on and advances a particular arrange-
ment of power/knowledge, it is not enough to argue that the solution to 
the above-mentioned issues lies in simply diversifying the field. Failing 
to address structural problems and deep-seated habits, diversity and 
inclusion strategies tend to make, at best, only a superficial impact, often 
putting the very people that they seek to ‘help’ in vulnerable positions 
and in peril. Because the problem is deep and widespread, and it involves 
other fields and institutions, not to mention established rankings, the 
celebrations of diversity and inclusion achievements of any given insti-
tution based on comparisons with others are often as deceiving as they 
are self-serving. The result is the eternal return of crisis and the ongoing 
production of a perverse circle that, at its most successful, leads to 
unending liberal interventions that make little to no difference or that 
make the problem worse.
In face of the eternal return of crisis and the perverse circle of Eurocen-
trism and white normativity, it becomes all the more necessary not simply 
to diversify philosophy, but to decolonise it. This involves addressing the 
Eurocentrism and the white male heteronormative foundations of the 
field, as well as the attitudes, institutional orders and day-to-day practices 
that allow Eurocentrism and white male heteronormativity to dominate 
the discipline. Far from simply diversifying philosophy and ‘including’ 
people of colour in it, decolonising philosophy requires a decolonial turn 
that touches on all the various aspects of philosophy as a field and as a 
practice. 
Based on Maldonado-Torres’s formulation of the term, we conceive the 
decolonial turn as a form of liberating and decolonising reason beyond 
the liberal and Enlightened emancipation of rationality, and beyond the 
more radical Euro-critiques that have failed to consistently challenge the 
legacies of Eurocentrism and white male heteronormativity (often Euro-
centric critiques of Eurocentrism).1 Otherwise put, the decolonial turn 
seeks to overcome hierarchies that impede true rigour and excellence 
in philosophical thinking. We complement Maldonado-Torres’s account 
of the decolonial turn in philosophy, theory and critique by providing 
an analysis of the trajectories of academic philosophy and clarifying 
the relevance of decolonising philosophy and of the decolonial turn for 
current efforts in transforming philosophy in face of the challenges of 
social movements such as the Third World Liberation Front and Black 
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Lives Matter in the United States, and Rhodes Must Fall in South Africa 
and England. 
After a brief analysis of the trajectory and current status of philosophy 
as a discipline in the modern Western research university, we provide 
examples of the decolonial turn and of decolonising philosophy in three 
areas: the engagement with (1) Asian and (2) Latin American philoso-
phies, and (3) debates in the philosophy of race and gender. To be sure, 
any serious effort to decolonise philosophy cannot be satisfied with 
simply adding new areas to an existing arrangement of power/knowledge, 
leaving the Eurocentric norms that define the field as a whole in place, 
or reproducing such norms themselves. For example, when engaging in 
non-European philosophies it is important to avoid reproducing prob-
lematic conceptions of time, space and subjectivity that are embedded in 
the Eurocentric definition of European philosophy and its many avatars. 
For this reason, Asia and Latin America here are not presented as con-
tinental others of Europe, but as constructed categories and projects 
that themselves need to be decolonised. For us, Asia and Latin America 
are not mere objects of study or non-problematic sites that serve as a 
ground for reflection, but spatio-temporal configurations that are part 
of modernity/coloniality.2 Likewise, we also approach race and gender 
not only as constructed social realities, but also as constructed categories 
themselves within what Latina philosopher María Lugones has called the 
colonial/modern gender system.3 Decolonising philosophy includes the 
critical examination of the dominant presuppositions about all these and 
other basic concepts in the search for a decolonial and post-continental 
mode of thinking, philosophy, and critique. 
Trajectories of disciplinary philosophy and the decolonial turn
Philosophy is not the only field that has to contend with the legacy of and 
continued investment in Eurocentrism and white male heteronormativ-
ity. The entire arrangement of the liberal arts and sciences arguably has 
to as well. But philosophy seems to have a special place among discourses 
in the liberal arts because it focuses on the roots of the university at large: 
reason. This includes providing criteria for identifying and demarcating 
the humanities, the natural sciences and the social sciences, as well as 
for distinguishing reason from faith, secularism from religion, and the 
‘primitive’ and the ancient from the modern. These are central columns 
in the edifice that sustains modern Western rationality and the modern 
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Western university. The modern Western research university and liberal 
arts therefore owe much of their basic conceptual infrastructure to phil-
osophical formulations of rationality, universalism, subjectivity, the 
relationship between the subject and object, truth and method – all of 
which become relevant targets of critical analysis in the decolonial turn.
It is arguably not rare, then, for philosophers to see themselves as 
custodians of Western critique and rationality, and with it, the Western 
university, especially the arts and sciences. Non-Western forms of theory 
and philosophy are kept out of philosophy canons and, at most, become 
objects of study in other fields. For example, Indigenous thought is 
barely recognised as philosophy and it is confined to the realm of spirit-
uality or culture, available for study by the religious studies scholar or the 
anthropologist. In the United States, even those who focus on American 
philosophy tend to conflate this area with US pragmatism and, when 
not, they typically fail to question the coloniality embedded in the 
category of ‘America’. For us, any effort to engage Indigenous theory and 
philosophy in the United States requires the simultaneous decolonisation 
of philosophy and of the idea of ‘America’. While we cannot do justice to 
this area in this context, we hope that the reflections here contribute to 
a further elaboration of the imperative to critically address the approach 
to Indigenous thought as part of the effort to decolonise philosophy and 
knowledge at large.
To be sure, in the current neoliberal times, philosophy, along with a 
good number of other humanities and social sciences, no longer occupies 
the position it enjoyed when the modern Western research university 
was in the process of securing a space of its own in the West. At that 
time, coming out of the European Enlightenment, philosophy, the newly 
defined humanities and the emerging social sciences were extremely 
valuable in addressing the needs of nation-states and empires in the 
process of construction or expansion.4 Today, many academics still try 
to defend the relevance of philosophy and the humanities by appealing 
to their contributions to the liberal nation-state and to the idea of cul-
tivating civility and good citizenship. As good as this may sound, these 
efforts arguably reflect what one could refer to as a decadent attitude that 
fails to address the problems of the liberal and racial nation-state and its 
links to the liberal arts and sciences.5 
There is also failure in missing the opportunity to make philosophy 
and the humanities relevant, not for the problematic task of trying to put 
a limit on neoliberalism, or to domesticate it, but for decolonising the 
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world. Since this task involves the very decolonisation of philosophy and 
of the humanities, many remain invested in these areas and in the liberal 
project of trying to save them from the onslaught of privatisation and 
neoliberalism rather than take on the challenge of decolonising them. 
And because they rightly oppose neoliberalism, the liberal defenders of 
the humanities obtain a sense of satisfaction that obscures the problem-
atic dimensions of liberalism, along with the liberal arts and sciences. 
When it is satisfied with contributing to, rather than critically examining, 
this defence of liberalism and the liberal arts and sciences, philosophy 
becomes, or rather continues its service as, the handmaiden of the racial 
liberal state. 
But modern Western philosophy has not always been functional with 
regard to the liberal order. It has also participated in its critique. Important 
waves of philosophical critique took place throughout the nineteenth 
century and especially in the mid-twentieth century after the spread of 
Fascism in Europe and two world wars. However, while European phi-
losophers learned and benefited from the critical voices that called for 
decolonisation in the Third World at that time,6 they overwhelmingly 
chose to limit the scope of their reflections and only see Europe or the 
Western classical ancient world as relevant for thinking. By taking various 
philosophical turns (the transcendental turn, the linguistic turn and the 
phenomenological turn, among others) within the horizons of Western 
modernity, they effectively evaded active and engaging participation in 
a larger decolonial turn that took place primarily in the emerging ‘Third 
World’ – including the Third World inside Western metropoles – that 
challenged modernity/coloniality. Instead, the work of the more critical 
European philosophers tended to become part of a Cold War dispute 
between philosophical orientations that were considered to be aligned 
with Marxism, on the one hand, and philosophical approaches that 
sought refuge in scientific models, logics and mathematics, on the other. 
From then on, academic philosophy became strongly divided between 
‘continental’ and ‘analytic’ philosophical camps. 
The divide between continental and analytic philosophy became par-
ticularly acute in the United States, which after the Second World War 
became a new global hegemon as much with respect to its military power 
as to the academy. It was in the United States that McCarthyism reigned 
supreme for a period in the 1950s, having tremendous impact in politics 
as well as in cultural production and the academy. As John McCumber 
has shown, in the context of the Cold War, McCarthyism played a key 
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role in getting rid of philosophers who questioned capitalism with their 
socio-historical analyses, and in motivating the assertion of an analytic 
model of philosophy which kept the field away from socio-political 
issues and closer to mathematics and the natural sciences.7 This situation 
favoured the growth of what were presumed to be apolitical and 
non-ideological philosophical orientations, which does not mean that 
analytic philosophy is inherently apolitical or that it cannot contribute 
to ideology critique. This led to or confirmed the minority position of 
specialists in continental philosophy in philosophy departments, who 
sometimes had to find other institutional homes. This migration con-
tributed to the popularity of ‘theory’ in the US humanities in the last 
part of the Cold War. To be sure, much of this ‘theory’, along with the 
continental philosophy taught in philosophy departments, was largely 
Eurocentric, even as it began to be used for projects that questioned 
Eurocentrism. 
Academic philosophy during the Cold War therefore seemed 
positioned between the Scylla of McCarthyism and the Charybdis of 
Eurocentrism. The significance of this situation should not be under-
estimated as it took place in the context where philosophical ideas that 
were critical of banners of the liberal nation-state, such as rationality and 
freedom, were spreading in multiple parts of the globe. College youth 
turned out to have an important role in questioning power dynamics 
worldwide during the 1960s and 1970s, and some philosophical works 
became powerful weapons in their hands. The struggles in the growing 
hegemonic philosophy departments, disciplined by McCarthyism and 
Eurocentrism, made academic philosophy less useful than it could 
have been in the process of producing generations of students who 
sought to critically engage the world. As a result, many students were 
forced to do philosophy outside of philosophy departments, and the 
more radical among them (e.g. the Black youth that created the Black 
Student Union in the US, and the Third World Liberation Front at San 
Francisco State University and the University of California Berkeley, 
among others) struggled to create new, non-Eurocentric, academic 
units. These spaces, often considered to be from a racist point of view 
no more than bastions of narrow identity politics or expressions of 
liberal multiculturalism, have served as engines for non-Eurocentric 
philosophy and critique.
Today we find ourselves in a peculiar context: we are no longer in the 
moment of Enlightened opposition to tradition wherein philosophical 
70 . decolonising the university
critique is considered central; nor are we in the context of continued 
liberal nation-state formation and imperial expansion, wherein the 
liberal arts and sciences function as handmaidens of the state. The 
Cold War period of increasing dominance of scientific conceptions of 
philosophy in the context of growing US hegemony is also in the past. 
Today we find an increasingly interconnected world with massively dis-
proportionate patterns of wealth, accelerated migration flows, and racist 
nativist attitudes that question the very category of ‘facts’. Consider that, 
while philosophical pretensions of scientificism during the Cold War 
could have generated a significant degree of legitimacy for the field of 
philosophy in the struggle to keep left-wing ideology and related forms 
of critical analysis at bay, pretensions of scientificism these days are 
increasingly taken as forms of elitism by populist right-wing forces that 
question the validity of science and facts. 
Overwhelmingly in our times, philosophy, along with the humanities, 
finds itself caught in a seeming opposition, which in fact is a spectrum, 
between the neoliberal erosion of liberal ideas of collective goods, 
which cannot be separated from racism, on the one hand, and racist 
nativist populism, on the other, which tends to combine racist views of 
collectivities with ideas about purely individual investment and success 
that are central in neoliberalism. The first, neoliberalism, questions 
forms of thinking and creating that do not contribute to privatisation, 
profit maximisation and corporate efficiency, while the second, nativist 
populism, questions the value of anything that undermines or even rel-
ativises the ideas and values perceived as central to the nativist view of 
the nation. 
All along, however, philosophy has faced the challenge of quite different 
voices which have raised questions about the meaning and significance 
of colonialism and decolonisation as central to an engagement with the 
modern/colonial world. These voices seek not only to enrich philosophy, 
but also to make it relevant to the planet at large. Instead of keeping 
academic philosophy sequestered by liberalism and Eurocentric leftist 
perspectives, or menaced by neoliberalism and nativism, the decolonial 
turn involves a dramatic opening and transformation of philosophy. 
It is an encounter with various forms of theorising and critique that 
helps everyone in the task of creating a world where dehumanisation, 
genocide and the early death of specific populations are not considered 
or effectively operate as a norm. 
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Decolonising philosophy and theory in and through Asia8
This section reflects on decolonising philosophy and theory in and 
through ‘Asia’ by tracing notable contributions from East Asian thinkers 
and by suggesting challenges that must be considered in the task of decol-
onising philosophy. In doing so, this section avers that ‘the geography of 
reason’ (to borrow the Caribbean Philosophical Association’s coinage)9 
in and through Asia is exhausted neither by the discipline of philosophy 
nor by a selective inclusion of only the cultural aspects of a presumed 
‘Asian’ identity in academic projects. The section is limited to East Asian 
references and is far from representing the entirety of conundrums faced 
by decolonial struggles in the heterogeneous area that is Asia.10 The East 
Asian context, however, is sure to resonate with such struggles in other 
areas placed outside of the West. 
Decolonising philosophy in and through Asia requires understanding 
the significance of the history of Asian thought in the present. East Asian 
thinkers such as Sun Ge (China) and Ch’a Sŭng-gi (South Korea) have 
addressed how Asians have theorised and could theorise Asia by tracing 
genealogies of Eastern thought. On the question of the meanings ‘Asia’ 
produces, Sun Ge asks: 
What does Asia imply? As a member of Asia, it is not merely due to the 
need to respond to the voices of the post-colonial intellectuals in the 
West that we reflect on Asia. On the contrary, whether Asia should be 
taken as a perspective of instrumental value, and on which level the 
question of Asia should be broached, is of concern to our own history. 
On the basis of this, we would ask: is Asia merely a question for the 
Japanese or other neighbouring East Asian countries? To the Chinese 
who, for a century, have not established any relation of partnership 
with the Japanese, what does Asia mean?11
Sun’s question reflects three important aspects relevant to this section’s 
considerations. First, the question of what Asia means directly concerns 
the historical realities of those who pose this question, beyond the 
invitation and inclusion from the West. Second, Asia is not a monolithic 
reality and therefore, attempts to define Asia have different meanings 
and significances depending on who asks the question and from what 
position. Third, imperialism and colonialism have had a significant 
impact on the discourse regarding Asia and on the relationship among 
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Asian countries. This is evinced as much in the profound impact of 
Japanese imperialism and Japan’s history of fascism in the region, as in 
projects of nation-state formation and Cold War reordering, to name 
only some of the more evident examples. 
In spite of, or perhaps precisely for these reasons, Sun argues that 
contemporary Asian thinkers must overcome both the present rhetoric 
of easy commercial globalisation and hasty erasures of different kinds 
of Asianism by post-Second World War progressives and leftists alike. 
Asian thinkers, Sun proffers, must undertake the difficult task of 
probing both Asia as an idea (i.e. history of thought, philosophy and 
ideals of different Pan-Asianisms) and Asia as a history and a region 
(i.e. knowledge produced by the disciplines of history, regional studies 
and the social sciences). Taking Japan as an example, this means a deep 
understanding of the contexts, positions and philosophical questions 
of Japanese thinkers of Asianism in the past is needed, such as those 
of Okakura Tenshin, Watsuji Tetsuro, Miyazaki Ichisada and Takeuchi 
Yoshimi. Without a methodical investigation into how different dis-
ciplines and lines of thought emerged in Japan in relation to the Asia 
question, contemporary questions on Asia posed by Asian thinkers as a 
‘perspective of instrumental value’12 reify the modern/colonial construc-
tion of time and space.
In a comparable step, Ch’a Sŭng-gi (South Korea) alerts one to the phil-
osophical engagements of Asian thinkers with modernity and Asia in the 
early twentieth century, to emphasise the role tradition has served as an 
imaginative methodology. Ch’a has analysed colonial-era (mostly from 
the 1930s and 1940s) Korean anti-modern thoughts’ ‘criticalities’ (the 
Korean word from which this is translated is closest in meaning to the 
sense used in physics, describing the boundary at which a phenomenon 
splits into multiple phenomena). In this analysis, Ch’a examines how 
‘Asian’ and ‘Korean’ traditions and value were multiply re-signified in 
relation to the changing understandings of the modern world order. 
Ch’a’s work highlights the creative ways in which Korean thinkers and 
writers such as Lee Byŏng-gi and Jŏng Ji-yong formed a critical relation 
to the coloniality of their present by seeing the problems of the present 
through the ‘eyes of the past’, rather than seeing the past from the anthro-
pological perspective of the present.13 The past that they conceived was 
not a moment that has passed or that was fixed at a distance but was con-
tinuously repeated enactments in the present. Through the practice of 
poetic meditation – a traditional practice reclaimed to enable becoming 
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beyond the present – these thinkers imagined alternatives to the modern/
colonial time-space. 
As Japanese imperialism intensified with the advent of the Pacific War, 
imperial Pan-Asianism emerged as another universalism that competed 
with the universalism of Western modernity. Japanese Pan-Asian multi-
culturalism codified the colony’s irreducible distance from the metropole 
as the colony’s ‘local colour’. At the same time, it re-spatialised Asia as a 
homogeneous entity in order to justify Japan’s imperial militarism as a 
step towards a world freed of modernity’s colonial burdens (gendai in 
Japanese, hyundae in Korean) as espoused by the Kyoto school ‘historical 
philosophers’.14 In this context, Korean intellectuals’ assertion of the 
temporality of tradition and the past, or of the persistence of tempo-
ralities that exceed the linear-progressive temporality of modernity, 
serve as critiques of the binary universalisms that justified Western and 
Japanese imperialism.15 For Ch’a, the critique and enactments surround-
ing tradition and the past borne out of these contestations continue to 
bear philosophical significance for the liberation struggles of the present 
moment.
As the works of Sun and Ch’a demonstrate, decolonising philosophy 
in and through Asia requires both inter-Asian and interdisciplinary 
conversations, but not without potential entrapments at every turn. 
From this perspective, any attempt to ‘represent’ or encapsulate Asian 
philosophy or thought in modules that can be unquestioningly delivered 
as a fixed canon, is problematically inadequate, and yet this often occurs 
in East–West dialogues. The Inter-Asia project in which Sun Ge (China) 
and Chen Kuan-Hsing (Taiwan) participate, and similar endeavours, 
are attentive to what Kwŏn Myŏng-a (South Korea) has criticised as 
the tendency in contemporary East Asian scholarship to overlook the 
ways in which globalisation consolidates marginalised and regionalised 
subjectivities under transnational refashionings.16 Such overviews are 
complicit with sub-imperialism or South–South imperialism, such as 
East Asian enterprise for cheap labour and resources in South East Asia 
and Africa.17 Chen Kuan-Hsing has similarly offered a critical examina-
tion of the ways in which the Western academy erases local thinkers by 
privileging the voices of diasporic, multicultural and metropolitan post-
colonial thinkers instead.18 Critical endeavours to decolonise thought 
across borders must therefore continuously contest different institutions’ 
reordering of knowledge which simultaneously represent and exclude in 
order to sustain the colonial circuits of knowledge production.19
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This institutional pull to re-order knowledge production concerns not 
only one’s interlocutors and one’s methodology, but also the object of 
inquiry itself; Eastern philosophy (as opposed to ‘Western philosophy’: 
these are the categories of philosophy deployed in some parts of East Asia) 
is a minoritised field of knowledge through the colonial difference20 even 
in the East Asian academy, yet it is still necessary to identify and divest 
Eastern philosophy of its colonial investments. ‘Eastern philosophy’ 
circulates as if colonial investments did not shape the genealogy itself. 
Overcoming the limit of its selective intellectual history is an engagement 
with its multiple erasures, such as the erasure of peripheralised parts 
of Asia in the process of consolidating the ‘Eastern’ tradition and the 
impact of the Cold War on the development of this tradition. Lauding, 
generalising and sampling a pre-constructed Eastern philosophy only 
satisfies the multiculturalist logic of inclusion rather than dismantling 
the colonial circuit of knowledge.
One necessary and transformative direction to pursue in order to 
decolonise philosophy in and through Asia is to challenge the construct 
of Asia itself in relation to the question of Indigeneity. What have been 
the integrations and erasures of Indigenous modes of thought in ‘Eastern 
philosophy’, and how do the challenges posed by Native people to the 
meaning of sovereignty change the genealogies and questions currently 
asked by thinkers dwelling on the Asia question?21 Examinations of 
settler-colonialism in the East Asian context have emerged in the form of 
settler-colonialism studies in history and anthropology22 and in the field 
of Transpacific studies,23 which engages with Indigenous knowledge 
productions as political and philosophical agents. This paradigm shift 
needs to be substantiated in the broader field of Asian studies and Asian 
philosophy. Indigenous peoples of East Asia and the Pacific have been 
fundamental and continued subjects of colonial rule. Many of them live 
with the high concentration of militarisation formed during the Cold 
War that remains in the region, which entails that they inordinately pay 
for the material, ecological, and biopolitical costs of securitisation.24 
Those engaging with the question of the meaning and significance of 
Asia and striving to decolonise philosophy, need to further wrestle with 
the modern/colonial legacy of scepticism towards the validity of popular 
and Indigenous socio-political movements on the ground as knowledge 
production. 
These questions and reflections are typically placed outside the 
horizon of efforts to ‘include’ Asia in the discipline of philosophy. The 
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decolonisation of philosophy in and through Asia requires something 
else: a sustained engagement, not only with academic philosophers in 
Asia, some of whom presuppose Eurocentric approaches to philosophy 
as the norm, but also with thinkers who critically engage the question 
‘what is Asia?’ and ‘how can Asia be decolonised?’ in relation to local 
histories and the longue durée of modernity/coloniality worldwide. 
Latin American liberation philosophy:  
reflections on Enrique Dussel’s Analectics
If ‘America’ is a geopolitical imaginary construct and a project of 
European colonial powers as Europeans sought to conquer the ‘New 
World’, ‘Latin America’ could be considered a project of creole elites that 
from its inception sought the reproduction of European institutions and 
values via the elimination of Indigenous populations and the exploitative 
use of African peoples brought in as slave labour.25 European colonisa-
tion thus not only precedes the formation of ‘Latin America’, but is also 
the principal condition of possibility for it to emerge. This means that 
European institutions, including universities, have been present in Latin 
America all throughout its history, and they continue to exist today as 
strong bastions of coloniality. 
Unsurprisingly, Latin American philosophers have not been well 
represented in academic philosophy, even in Latin America. Part of the 
reason for this is because Latin American philosophers overwhelmingly 
write in Spanish and Portuguese, languages which fell from grace as 
worthy of philosophical reflection just as the Spanish and Portuguese 
empires started to fall from hegemony within the geopolitical struggles 
of the modern world-system. There is also the fact that philosophical 
production in Latin America is often looked at as if it is either too indis-
tinguishable from European thought, although dependent and inferior, 
or too different and exotic (especially Indigenous philosophies), to the 
point where it is not taken as legitimate philosophy. For this reason, the 
question of whether there is a Latin American philosophy has been an 
important one in the region.26
We cannot rehearse the debate about the existence of philosophy in 
Latin America here. Our interest in this context is rather the indiffer-
ence of mainstream academic philosophy to the topic of Latin American 
philosophy, though sometimes granting that there is some kind of 
distinct philosophy in order to satisfy liberal calls for the diversifica-
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tion of established canons. This liberal approach, we argue, is a form 
of co-optation that treats non-Western knowledges as tokens that 
are expected to conform and avoid threatening the modern/colonial 
epistemic status of philosophy and the university in general. In this 
section, we wish to explore ways to decolonise philosophy by seriously 
engaging the radicality of ‘Latin American’ thought, while also taking 
into serious consideration the coloniality embedded in the very idea of 
Latin America. Given the limited extent of this chapter, we will consider 
contributions from one philosopher of liberation whose work has been 
greatly influential in the critique of Eurocentrism and the exploration 
of South–South philosophical debates. He also happens to be the most 
prolific Latin American philosopher to date: the Argentine-Mexican 
philosopher Enrique Dussel.
The project of liberation philosophy (filosofía de la liberación), as artic-
ulated in Dussel’s work is a concrete attempt to decolonise philosophy, 
which has also been described as a major project in the decolonial turn.27 
Liberation philosophy begins by deflating the pretended universalism of 
modern Western philosophy, placing the latter within an anthropological 
history of the development of the planet’s thought-systems.28 Addition-
ally, Dussel connects the history of modern Western philosophy to the 
unfolding of the modern/colonial world. If modern Western philosophy 
claims to begin with René Descartes’ reflections on the ego cogito, Dussel 
locates this particular contribution within the existential horizon of 
Europe’s ego conquiro, the ethico-political presupposition that – from 
the ‘Reconquista’ of Al-Andalus and the encounter with Tainos in 1492 
to the conquest of Aztec and Incan civilisations in the early sixteenth 
century – led a Christian Spanish empire out of its provincial status 
vis-à-vis the Muslim world.29 The genesis of modern Western philosophy 
thus requires an investigation into its historical conditions of possibility, 
which includes an examination of conceptions of world and self that are 
tied to the idea of ‘discovery’, the justification of conquest and the natu-
ralisation of slavery. 
Liberation philosophy posits that without a serious attempt to dwell 
in the constitutive outside of modernity, philosophy as a mode of 
thinking (whether inside or outside of the university) would remain not 
only Eurocentric but also colonialist. It is important to clarify, however, 
that this move to think outside of modernity is not for the sake of 
dropping anchor in a pure position of exteriority. Against any problem-
atic desire for purity, liberation philosophy simply seeks to think from 
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the site which most obviously and directly experiences the philosoph-
ical discourse of modernity as a discourse of colonisation30 in order 
to transcend the totalising project of modernity/coloniality. This task 
does not require the constant policing of disciplinary boundaries, as is 
typically the case in Eurocentric philosophy. If an example of the latter 
includes the self-referential dialectics of modernity, which assimilate 
the world as they expand their totalising domination from within the 
rhetoric of modernity, like Hegel’s philosophy of history,31 then the 
method of liberation philosophy is instead an analectics of the underside 
of modernity. 
For Dussel, who coined the term, analectics entail a rupturing (from 
the rhetoric of modernity) affirmation (by and within those negated 
subjects) aimed towards the transformation of the modern/colonial 
totality to bring forth nothing less than a new world.32 If dialectics have 
been deployed to challenge the internal contradictions of modernity, then 
they have also presupposed modernity’s own ontological horizon by not 
dislodging its logic of identity and difference.33 In other words, the point 
of departure for dialectics is internal to the rhetoric of modernity itself. 
Dialectics thus do not entail a real transformation of consciousness and 
of the world, but only the affirmation of an identity that is presumed as 
always-already existing. Analectics, on the other hand, dislodge the logic 
of identity and difference in their entirety by refusing the self-referential 
terms set by such rhetoric of modernity. Analectics’ point of departure 
is not an already recognised identity with internal contradictions, but 
instead the zone of violence and ontological erasure, the colonial world, 
which the totalising system of Western modernity does not recognise as 
worthy of philosophical reflection. 
This is not to say that liberation philosophy negates any potential critical 
rationality in modernity and its dialectics. Rather, liberation philosophy 
seeks to subsume such rationality into a more ample framework while 
negating the irrational and violent colonial side of modernity. A critical 
effort to depart from the underside of modernity would thus supplement 
any negative dialectics (‘the negation of the negation’) with ‘the affirma-
tion of the Exteriority of the Other’, which carries with it the possibility 
of a truly other world.34 This is the constitutive moment of the analectic 
method, which requires a pedagogical transformation, knowing how to 
listen to the ‘revealing’ word of this Other beyond the system, a lived 
face-to-face praxis that cannot be expressed through the language of the 
existing system.35 To be sure, the other world called upon is posited not 
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in the univocal universalist way through which the myth of modernity 
projects its own vision, but in a pluriversal horizon that rethinks the 
concept of universality itself.36 Articulating a critique of modernity by 
affirming its underside, liberation philosophy thus surpasses the limita-
tions of the philosophical discourse of modernity (the fact that its own 
dialectics are monological and not dialogical) in a way that also goes 
beyond the Eurocentrism of (post)modernity, which often is sceptical of 
rational discourses in their entirety while at the same time limiting the 
categories of rational discourse and universality to Europe. Performing a 
rupturing shift in the geography of reason,37 liberation philosophy effec-
tively calls for a transmodern horizon that does not discard reason but 
instead seeks its co-realisation through those subjects that experience 
modernity as coloniality.38 
Liberation philosophy’s engagement with the theory of the Frankfurt 
School serves as an example of the analectic method. Not seeking to 
fully reject the contributions of this community of thinkers for its Euro-
centrism, liberation philosophy retains what is useful for a decolonial 
project while dispensing with pernicious Eurocentrisms and their 
related burdens. Taken from the first generation of the Frankfurt School, 
an emphasis on materiality (as the ‘affirmation of living corporeality’) 
and negativity (the negation of suffering), are central to the currents of 
liberation philosophy.39 From the second generation of the Frankfurt 
School, liberation philosophy retains the turn towards discursivity and 
intersubjectivity (lacking in the first generation). Liberation philosophy 
therefore retains what is useful from both the first and second genera-
tions of the Frankfurt School. Notably, it does not dispense with negative 
materiality, which the leading second-generation Frankfurt School 
thinkers – like Jürgen Habermas – have problematically discarded in the 
name of a procedural formalism. And against the ‘ontological Eurocen-
trism’ of the Frankfurt School (including the third generation), liberation 
philosophy highlights the moment of exclusion within discursivity, the 
exteriority of any community of communication that launches liberatory 
praxis.40 Additionally, liberation philosophy harnesses the critical dis-
cursivity of the excluded against the totalising dominant community. Far 
from denying the contributions of the Frankfurt School in a reactionary 
fashion, liberation philosophy critically approaches it from a different 
geopolitical and epistemological position. Liberation philosophy aims 
to dispense with the Frankfurt School’s coloniality and subsume what 
is useful from it (e.g. materiality, negativity, discursivity and inter-
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subjectivity) within a decolonial and transmodern horizon towards a 
non-Eurocentric ‘critical philosophy with global validity’.41 This is one 
brief example of how the categorical and methodological framework 
presented by liberation philosophy should prove useful for those seeking 
the decolonisation of philosophy at distinct levels of abstraction.
To be sure, the case of liberation philosophy is just one among many 
critical projects that pursue the decolonisation not just of philosophy, 
but of all thought and life. Part of why liberation philosophy is so critical 
in its attempts to decolonise philosophy, however, is that it dislodges 
the centrality of Eurocentric philosophy from the very start. This is the 
moment of ‘delinking’42 or rupture that prevents the project of liberation 
philosophy from collapsing into a version of the liberal ‘inclusion of the 
Other’ paradigm of what is already considered ‘philosophy’. Instead, 
liberation philosophy calls for the transformation of what philosophy 
is from the very start. Within the globalised modern Western research 
university, this means that departments of philosophy have to do much 
more than diversify their canons in order to get rid of their modern/
colonial inheritances. A meta-philosophical re-drawing of its own being 
requires that philosophical discourse engage in an open dialogue with 
other geographies of reason, including other disciplines within the 
university, which have, in many ways, already been philosophising, such 
as ethnic studies and women and gender studies. In this sense, philosophy 
needs to learn to listen to the revealing views and words of those who 
have been considered outside of the scope of theory and reason. The 
decolonisation of philosophy, which is taking place alongside simul-
taneous decolonial efforts across disciplinary boundaries, ultimately 
points to the decolonisation of the university itself as a site of knowledge 
production. This is a transdisciplinary struggle, which will no doubt 
change everyone involved in the process. And yet, this epistemic struggle 
itself is only a small part of the broader transmodern impetus to create, 
as the Zapatistas from south-east Mexico say, a new world in which 
many worlds can fit.
Decolonising philosophical approaches to race and gender 
The decolonial turn invites a critique of modernity/coloniality within the 
epistemic paradigms governing theories of gender and race as practised 
in philosophy. Identifying and critically analysing the Enlightenment 
concepts on which feminist theory and philosophies of race are 
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built – concepts like justice, equality and rights – decolonial thought 
(re-)imagines the potential of transmodern engagements (Dussel) with 
race and gender. Decolonial thought utilises genealogies critical of 
colonialism in order to imagine alternative horizons for gender and race 
theories.
Philosophical approaches to race and gender have historically focused 
on a politics of redistribution and recognition as potential sites of critical 
social intervention. For example, feminist theorists Simone de Beauvoir, 
Luce Irigaray and bell hooks, to name just a few, have focused their 
respective critiques of patriarchy on the lack of recognition extended 
to women. In The Second Sex de Beauvoir argues that society reduces 
women to their biological sex and in so doing recognises only their repro-
ductive potential.43 Women’s liberation in this account is represented 
as the social recognition of women as project-making beings capable 
of engaging in projects of transcendence. Irigaray’s politics of recogni-
tion takes issue with canonical and masculinist philosophical theories 
as well as the underlying tension of sexual difference on which these 
traditions rest.44 bell hooks’ early work, Feminist Theory: From Margin 
to Center, criticises second wave feminism for excluding black women 
in the very conception of womanhood, which resulted in a failure to 
recognise the unique oppressions faced by women of colour.45 Restricted 
by the power/knowledge arrangement of philosophy from the mid to 
late twentieth century, these interrogations into race and gender remain 
limited in their respective critiques of the liberal order. By focusing upon 
the liberatory goals of recognition and redistribution, these philosophies 
of race and gender were quickly subsumed by the overarching liberal 
order and diverted from their original aims of decolonising theory and 
power within philosophy. 
As part of the ongoing growth of the decolonial turn, among related 
movements, the legacies of colonial forms of redistribution and rec-
ognition in the academy have been extended by thinkers who have a 
more explicit critique of liberalism. Here one can list figures such as 
Linda Martín Alcoff,46 Sylvia Wynter and Lewis Gordon.47 They and 
theorists with similar orientations have developed socio-political 
theories concerned with race, ethnicity and gender without limiting 
their accounts to either liberation as mere recognition or to liberal con-
ceptions of identity.48 They also challenge the standard conceptualisation 
and separation of gender and race, inviting us to conceive decolonial 
thought in terms of what Sylvia Wynter has aptly termed the ‘demonic 
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ground’ outside of our present mode of being/feeling/knowing.49 Con-
sideration of the ‘demonic ground’ is an activity that becomes crucial 
in the decolonial turn because it includes a meta-critique of colonialist 
epistemic paradigms, which is missing in mainstream analytic and con-
tinental philosophy as well as in white feminisms. 
Wynter’s article, ‘Afterword: Beyond Miranda’s Meanings: Un/silencing 
the “Demonic Ground” of Caliban’s “Woman”’, is a concrete example 
of a distinctly decolonial engagement with gender and race. Notably 
this decolonial intervention does not begin with an either/or. Using a 
critical genealogy of history, Wynter’s analysis is one step removed from 
sexual or racial difference as essential difference. According to Wynter, 
the primary antagonism that has shaped society since the sixteenth 
century is not ‘male’ versus ‘female’ but ‘man’ versus ‘native/nigger’.50 The 
‘primary code of difference’ does not break down in terms of a single 
binary like sameness and difference. In this alternative schema, ‘Man’ 
represents a new secular shift towards rationality. The category ‘Man’ 
includes, first and foremost, rational beings. In this schema, women, 
specifically white women, are grouped in the dominant social category, 
which stands in opposition to the native, who is regarded as irrational 
or even arational. According to Wynter’s decolonial genealogy, since 
the sixteenth century, racial/cultural difference – what Mignolo refers 
to as the colonial difference – represents the primary category of social 
distinction internal to which there are a series of other dichotomies, 
including sexual difference. 
Wynter’s account of social difference is not, as it might first appear, 
a simple reordering of the all too familiar identity categories belonging 
to philosophies of race and of feminist theories. Wynter does not, for 
example, prioritise race over gender or vice versa.51 Instead, by grouping 
the racial and cultural together (i.e. racial/cultural), Wynter sidesteps 
the tendencies of simple rankings. Colonial difference means that white 
European men represent the ordering principle around which the social 
is structured. However, insofar as Man stands in opposition to ‘native/
nigger’, the former also includes white, European, women. Already 
we can see that a politics of representation has become complicated. 
There is no single narrative of equality. White women, for example, 
embody the dominant cultural/racial category to the extent that they are 
European and white (and Christian and rational, at least in comparison 
to the ‘native’ and even more radically and primal for Wynter, the 
‘nigger’). In contrast to men, however, they still fall short of the ideal 
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within the dominant ordering logic because they fail to fully embody 
rationality. Conversely, the struggle for women of colour – the struggle 
of Caliban’s woman – is a struggle around the racial/cultural/rational. 
In Shakespeare’s The Tempest, Caliban’s woman is not only absent from 
the play, and therefore absent from the competition of erotic desire, but 
she is also structurally and ontologically absent in a way that makes 
the represented symbolic order of desire, of culture, and of rational-
ity possible. As Wynter states, ‘the absence of Caliban’s woman, is an 
absence which is functional to the new secularizing schema by which 
the peoples of Western Europe legitimated their global expansion as 
well as their expropriation and/their [sic] marginalisation of all the 
other population-groups of the globe’.52 Wynter’s account suggests that a 
politics of representation, a politics that governs at least some important 
sectors of contemporary feminist theories and philosophies of race, 
is impossible within coloniality’s symbolic order because this order 
depends upon the ontological exclusion of Caliban’s woman, that is, the 
native’s female companion. 
Using Wynter’s critical genealogy as described above, a potential 
method of decolonial feminist and anti-racist thought becomes clear. 
A decolonial approach seeks to ‘de-code the system of meaning of that 
other discourse [whether the dominant discourse of the status quo or 
the critical discourses of feminist theory and philosophy of race], which 
has imposed this mode of silence for some five centuries’.53 Decolonial 
thought goes beyond voicing the silenced narratives of Caliban’s woman. 
Decolonial thought is a double movement that, on the one hand, seeks 
to unearth the demonic ground that makes the symbolic order possible, 
and on the other, erects new discursive horizons from the standpoint of 
coloniality’s underside.
Wynter’s intervention demonstrates the point made in a previous 
section: that decolonising philosophy is not fundamentally about diver-
sifying established canons by including certain authors or themes in 
the discipline. Decolonising philosophy is a form of reflection that 
emerges from intellectual, social, artistic and related movements that 
challenge colonisation and that seek to advance decolonisation. For 
academic philosophy, this means that any effort towards diversifying 
the discipline needs to be prefaced by serious consideration of the 
complex, non-binary interrelations between subject positions (e.g. 
race, gender, sexuality, ability) and their entanglement in modernity/
coloniality. This means that diversification cannot take place without 
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decolonisation. Likewise, the struggle against exclusion in academic 
philosophy demands decolonisation, which involves the critical interro-
gation of existing efforts of liberal inclusion and the terms and criteria 
used therein. This process involves the meta-philosophical exercise of 
critically engaging various categories of analysis, including basic geo-
political terms (the West, Asia, Latin America), basic philosophical 
concepts (reason, universality, dialectics), and basic objects of social 
analysis (race and gender). That some of the key figures involved 
in decolonial thinking are often not recognised as philosophers 
illustrates the nature of the challenge. Fortunately, neither decoloni-
sation nor critique nor thinking have never depended strictly upon 
academic philosophy. But academic philosophy could find more ways 
to contribute to these tasks if it seriously engages in its own critique and 
decolonisation. This chapter aims to be an effort, among many other 
efforts in myriad places and spaces, in this direction.
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